number of EMDs followed them. What is more, the WTO has safeguards that may give nations the flexibility to regulate flows under some circumstances. But a proliferation of FTAs and BITs were enacted between industrialized countries and EMDs in which many EMDs agreed to restrict their ability to regulate crossborder finance. Interestingly, many EMDs still enjoy the policy space to regulate capital flows under the WTO, but their FTAs and BITs leave them far less flexibility to regulate cross-border finance-especially those treaties signed with the United States.
These differences between the WTO and FTAs/BITs are summarized in Table 8 .1. The WTO allows nations to deploy regulations on both inflows and outflows as long as the nations have not committed to the liberalization of certain financial services. If a nation has made commitments in financial services, restrictions on capital flows are not permitted without being subject to claims. There are safeguard measures that may be applied, however. If a nation that has liberalized financial services does restrict capital inflows or outflows, that nation could be subject to a dispute filed by another nation-state. In addition, trade sanctions can be put in place if the nation is found in violation of WTO rules.
In contrast, and unlike the treaties of other industrialized countries, US BITs and FTAs do not permit restrictions on inflows or outflows. If a nation does restrict either type of capital flow, it can be subject to investor-state arbitration whereby the government of the host state pays for the "damages" accrued to the foreign investor. The BITs and FTAs of other major capital exporters, such as those negotiated by the European Union, Japan, China, and Canada, either completely carve host-country legislation on capital account regulations out of the agreements (therefore, permitting them) or allow regulation as a temporary safeguard on inflows and outflows to prevent or mitigate a financial crisis. The treaties with the United States do not have either measure, except in a few cases that include a grace period in which foreign investors are not allowed to file claims against a host state until after the crisis has subsided.
EMDs were able to preserve such policy space at the WTO because the nature of the institution allows for consensus and, thus, interesting coalitions among EMDs have arisen (for a good discussion of policy space, see Mayer 2009). In contrast, in both FTAs and BITs between an industrialized countries and EMDs, asymmetric bargaining power and collective action problems often lead EMDs to trade away their ability to reregulate cross-border finance.
In this chapter, I trace how, in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, industrialized nations moved the forum for capital account liberalization to the trading regime; I also analyze the extent to which nations must liberalize the capital account and the extent to which nations have the ability to regulate cross-border financial flows under the WTO, BITs, and FTAs. I then examine how some nations are attempting to reclaim or preserve their policy space for regulating cross-border finance in the wake of the global financial crisis and discuss the political economy factors that led some countries to trade away the policy space to regulate cross-border finance.
The World Trade organization
By the late 1990s, industrialized countries were also effectively restricting the ability of EMDs to regulate capital flows through their trade and investment treaties; this has been almost completely overlooked in the literature on the political economy of governing capital flows. Most industrialized countries granted each other market access through the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS; a WTO treaty that came into force in 1995), particularly through the Annexes on Financial Services to the GATS, agreed on in 1997 and put into effect shortly thereafter.
The United States had spearheaded a move to include services in global trade negotiations for the WTO Uruguay Round (1986 -1992 . Because of the strong US financial lobby, the United States particularly took the lead role in the
Box 8.1: General Agreement on Trade in Services Modes and Financial Services
Mode 1: Cross-border supply is defined to cover services flows from the territory of one Member into the territory of another Member (e.g., banking or architectural services transmitted via telecommunications or mail);
Mode 2: Consumption abroad happens when the consumer travels outside of the country to access a service such as tourism, education, health care, and so forth;
Mode 3: Commercial presence occurs when the user of a financial service is immobile and the provider is mobile, implying that the financial service supplier of one WTO Member establishes a territorial presence, possibly through ownership or lease, in another Member's territory to provide a financial service (e.g., subsidiaries of foreign banks in a domestic territory); and Mode 4: Presence of natural persons are when financial services are supplied by individuals of one country in the territory of another. liberalization of financial services (Hoekman and Kosecki 2009). Indeed, services used to be referred to in the economics literature as nontradables but were reconstructed as "trade in services" in the GATS under four modes of supply (see box 8.1) Under the GATS, nations can liberalize across these four modes of financial services. The two most important modes in terms of the capital account are Mode 1 (the cross-border supply of financial services) and Mode 3 (the establishment of a commercial presence by financial service providers).
The GATS provides a general framework for disciplining policies affecting "trade in services" and establishes a commitment for periodic future negotiations. The GATS is divided into "General Obligations" and "Specific Commitments." General obligations bind all members. These include the obligation to provide most-favored-nation treatment to all WTO members (Article II) and some disciplines on nondiscriminatory domestic regulations that are still being fully developed (Article VI). Specific commitments apply only to the extent that countries choose to adopt them by listing them in their country-specific schedules. These cover primarily the disciplines of Market Access (Article XVI) and National Treatment (Article XVII) (Raghavan 2009).
Generally speaking, GATS negotiations and commitments follow a "positive list" approach, in which nations commit to bind only to specified sectors to GATS disciplines. This stands in contrast with a "negative list" approach, which is more common in goods negotiations and in most FTAs. In a negative list (or top-down) approach, negotiators assume that all sectors will be covered in some way, except a handful that are listed by particular nations. WTO members have recourse to binding dispute settlement procedures, in which perceived violations of GATS commitments can be challenged and retaliatory sanctions or payments can be authorized as compensation.
For this discussion, I focus on three effects of the GATS:
• Nations that did not make Mode 1 or Mode 3 commitments under the GATS are free to regulate cross-border capital flows.
• Nations that did make Mode 1 or Mode 3 commitments are not permitted to regulate cross-border finance if it is part of the service that has been liberalized. • Member countries may be able to temporarily derogate from such commitments through two exceptions written into the GATS.
Capital Account Liberalization, Cross-Border Financial Regulations, and the General Agreement on Trade in Services
Unbeknownst to many, GATS commitments require the opening of the capital account. Nations that make commitments under Modes 1 and 3 for financial services are required to permit capital to flow freely to the extent that such capital is an integral part of the service provided. GATS Article XVI on Market Access references capital liberalization:
If a Member undertakes a market-access commitment in relation to the supply of a service through the mode of supply referred to in subparagraph 2(a) of Article I [i. Liberalizing financial services under the GATS does not require the wholesale liberalization of the capital account per se. Sydney Key notes that "the bottom line is that if a country makes a commitment to liberalize trade with respect to a particular financial service in the GATS, it is also making a commitment to liberalize most capital movements associated with the trade liberalization commitment" (2003, 20) . In 2010, the WTO reiterated that liberalizing cross-border trade in financial services (Mode 1) may need an open capital account to facilitate such trade that, of course, results in international capital flows. A similar scenario can be outlined for Mode 3 liberalization. A loan extended by a foreign bank to a domestic client requiring capital to be transferred from the parent company of the foreign bank to its subsidiary abroad would also require an open capital account (WTO 2010) .
The IMF cites the following Mode 1 example, where a loan extended by a domestic bank to a foreign customer using internationally raised capital creates international capital flows and international trade in financial services. To the extent that a financial services transaction involved an international capital transaction, the capital account needs to be opened for the former to take place freely (Kireyev 2002) . Another paper by an IMF official provides examples of how the GATS Mode 1 essentially requires the liberalization of a capital account:
to the extent that a member restricts its residents from borrowing from non-residents, a member's commitment to allow banks of other members to provide cross-border lending services to its nationals would require a relaxation of this restriction. Similarly, if a member also makes a commitment to permit non-resident banks to provide cross-border deposit services, such a commitment would require the member to liberalize restrictions it may have imposed on the ability of residents to hold accounts abroad. In these respects, the GATS serves to liberalize the making of both inward and outward investments. (Hagan 2000, 24) That said, if a nation has not listed cross-border trade in financial services (Mode 1) or the commercial presence of foreign services (Mode 3), that country may be free to regulate capital flows as it sees fit. Indeed, numerous EMDs have listed neither the liberalization of cross-border trade in financial services nor Mode 3 commitments under the GATS. According to the WTO, the majority of EMDs made relatively fewer commitments in financial services related to capital markets (WTO 2010) . At the conclusion of the GATS, IMF analysts found that about sixteen countries had significant Mode 1 commitments in financial services, while around fifty had significant Mode 3 commitments for the sector-this included most OECD countries and just a few EMDs (Valckx 2002; Kireyev 2002) . Table 8 .2 lists the nations that are most committed to open capital accounts under the WTO-GATS. These thirty-seven nations have committed to scheduling the liberalization of some combination of Modes 1, 2, and 3 under the last round of GATS negotiations. (New negotiations are currently underway; Valckx 2002). These are also the nations that are most prone to being disciplined under the GATS. Note that there is not a reassuring record of countries successfully invoking exceptions at the WTO.
If the capital account regulations of a member nation are found to be in violation of its GATS commitments, the ability of the nation to invoke one or more of the exceptions in the GATS text is a matter of significant legal debate and is thus far untested by an actual WTO tribunal. A first option may be to claim that the measure was taken for prudential reasons under Article 2(a) of the Annex on Financial Services. This exception reads, "Notwithstanding any other provisions of the Agreement, a Member shall not be prevented from taking measures for prudential reasons, including for the protection of investors, depositors, policy holders or persons to whom a fiduciary duty is owed by a financial service supplier, or to ensure the integrity and stability of the financial system. Where such measures do not conform with the provisions of the Agreement, they shall not be used as a means of avoiding the Member's commitments or obligations under the Agreement." It is also possible to argue that inflows controls, such as unremunerated reserve requirements or inflows taxes, were of a prudential nature, especially given the new economics of capital controls (see chapter 9).
Legal scholars and EMDs have expressed concern that Article XII may not pertain to regulations on inflows to prevent crises and that the language in the prudential carve-out may pertain only to microprudential (individual financial institution) stability rather than macroprudential financial stability (Hagan 2000; Viterbo 2012; Tucker 2013) . Moreover, the sentence stating that prudential measures "shall not be used as a means of avoiding the Member's commitments or obligations under the Agreement" is regarded by some as self-cancelling and thus of limited utility (Tucker and Wallach 2009; Raghavan 2009 ). Others, however, If the capital account regulations of a member nation are found to be in violation of its GATS commitments in financial services, it may also be able to invoke Article XII, "Restrictions to Safeguard the Balance of Payments," which states:
In the event of serious balance-of-payments and external financial difficulties or threat thereof, a Member may adopt or maintain restrictions on trade in services on which it has undertaken specific commitments, including on payments or transfers for transactions related to such commitments. It is recognized that particular pressures on the balance of payments of a Member in the process of economic development or economic transition may necessitate the use of restrictions to ensure, inter alia, the maintenance of a level of financial reserves adequate for the implementation of its programme of economic development or economic transition. (Article XII, para. 1)
The next paragraph in this article of the GATS specifies that such measures can be deployed as long as they do not discriminate among other WTO members, are consistent with the IMF Articles (thus, pertain only to capital account controls), "avoid unnecessary damage" to other members, do "not exceed those necessary" to deal with the balance-of-payments problem, and are temporary and phased out progressively.
It may be extremely difficult for a capital account regulation to meet all these conditions, especially the hurdles dealing with the notion of "necessity," a slippery concept in trade law that countries have had difficulty proving. Moreover, concern has been expressed about the extent to which the balance-of-payments exception provides nations with the policy space for restrictions on capital inflows that are more preventative in nature and may occur before "serious" balance-of-payments difficulties exist (Hagan 2000; Viterbo 2012; Gallagher and Stanley 2013) .
In a nutshell, if a nation has not committed to liberalizing Modes 1 or 3 financial services, then it is free to regulate cross-border finance as it sees fit. If it has made such commitments, it will find cross-border finance more difficult to regulate, although some untested exceptions may apply. What about for FTAs and BITs?
us bilateral investment Treaties and Free-Trade agreements in comparative Perspective
FTAs and BITs, especially those engaging the United States, increasingly restrict the ability of nations to regulate capital flows. The investment provisions of US trade treaties (which are mimicked in US BITs) require that all forms of capital "move freely and without delay" among the parties to the treaty. Moreover, whereas GATS negotiations are of a positive list variety, FTA and BIT negotiations deploy a negative list approach. At the GATS, disputes are settled between nation-states, but trade and investment treaties increasingly have provisions for an "investor-state" dispute settlement that allow a private investor to directly file a claim for damages against a signatory nation that regulates capital flows. Perhaps most concerning is that, for the most part, there are no exceptions or safeguards in the US treaties. This stands in contrast to EU, Japanese, and Canadian treaties that provide exceptions for the use of capital controls under certain circumstances or carves them out altogether.
Investment Provisions in US Bilateral Investment Treaties and Free-Trade Agreements
The United States has engaged in investment treaty-making since its War of Independence through what were called Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation treaties. The successors to those agreements are the BITs, which the United States has been negotiating since 1977. The United States did not invent BITs; Europeans had BITs going back to 1959. Indeed, there are now more than 2,000 BITs in existence. Beginning with the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994, US FTAs also have investment provisions analogous to those found in BITs. In addition, BITs and FTAs include provisions on financial services.
BITs and the investment provisions in US FTAs have evolved over time. Normally, through an interagency process and with input from outside experts and interests, the United States puts together a Model BIT 1 that serves as the template for negotiations for BITs and FTAs: "The model would be tendered to the other party at the beginning of negotiations with the hope that agreement would be reached on a text that did not differ substantively or even in a significant stylistic In terms of coverage, whereas the earliest BITs and FTAs focused almost solely on foreign direct investment, contemporary (third-wave) treaties cover both inflows and outflows of virtually all types of investment, including equities, securities, loans, derivatives, sovereign debt, and the financial services facilitators of such flows. According to Kenneth Vandevelde (2008), there are five general components of US BITs and subsequent provisions in US FTAs (listed in box 8.2). In addition to these core elements, US treaties often include some "exceptions," such as for essential security and for matters related to taxation (governed under another body of US international law). Finally, post-2004 BITs have putative limitations on the ability of host states to reduce environmental or labor laws to attract foreign investment.
Box 8.2: Key Provisions of US Bilateral Investment Treaties
Minimum standard of treatment. An investor should enjoy a minimum standard of treatment, including national treatment and most-favored nation-states in both the preestablishment and post-establishment rights. On an absolute level, US investors are to receive "fair and equitable treatment and full protection in accordance to customary international law."
Restrictions on expropriation. BITs and FTAs strictly forbid the direct or indirect expropriation of US investments absent prompt and full compensation.
Free transfers. US nationals and firms must be permitted to freely transfer payments in and out of a host country "without delay."
No performance requirements. US BITs forbid nations from imposing performance requirements such as local content rules, joint-venture and research-anddevelopment requirements, export requirements, and rules related to personnel decisions. Before we move forward, it should be underscored that these treaties elevate foreign investor rights over domestic investors in that they do not require the host-country firms to liberalize their investments, nor do they permit hostcountry investors to use investor-state arbitration (Hagan 2000).
Capital Account Regulations in US Trade and Investment Treaties
The United States has concluded forty-six BITs since 1977, and more recently it has used language that is very similar to BIT wording as part of the investment chapters of twelve US FTAs (Vandevelde 2008). These US-style investment rules include many more limitations on the ability of nations to regulate cross-border finance. Specifically, US investment rules:
• Do not permit restrictions on both capital inflows and outflows.
• Provide no clear safeguards for balance-of-payments exceptions, although some FTAs provide a grace period for filing investor-state claims.
• Elevate the rights of US capital investors over domestic capital investors.
US investors can file claims against violating parties through an investorstate dispute settlement process and receive financial compensation for violations, but domestic investors do not have this right.
The free transfer of funds to and from the United States is a core principle of US BITs and FTAs, as well as those of most other capital-exporting countries. When a host nation violates that principle, or if capital transfers violate the other principles, the host nation could be subject to an investor-state arbitration claim and be sued for damages. All US BITs and FTAs, therefore, restrict the ability of host nations to regulate capital flows (Anderson 2009a; Gallagher 2011) , and all US BITs and FTAs require host nations to permit free transfers without delay of all types of covered investments. Moreover, financial services are covered in BITs and are included in a separate chapter in FTAs. Analogous to the GATS, if a nation commits to liberalizing financial services, it commits to the free flow of such investment as well. Note, however, that under the services chapters of US FTAs, dispute resolution is state to state.
Over the years, US treaties have listed numerous types of investments as being covered, such as securities, loans, FDIs, bonds (both sovereign and private), and derivatives. Treaties also make a point of stating that such a list is not exhaustive. Taken together, the transfers provisions, along with the other principles of the agreements, ensure that an investment can enter and leave a nation freely. If the investment is restricted for some reason, the host nation can be subject to investor-state arbitration.
With one exception (NAFTA), US treaties do not include a balance-of-payments exception, as does the GATS. They do, however, have a prudential exception, similar to the one found in the GATS Annex on Financial Services (2010): Notwithstanding any other provision of this Treaty, a Party shall not be prevented from adopting or maintaining measures relating to financial services for prudential reasons*, including for the protection of investors, depositors, policy holders, or persons to whom a fiduciary duty is owed by a financial services supplier, or to ensure the integrity and stability of the financial system. Where such measures do not conform with the provisions of this Treaty, they shall not be used as a means of avoiding the Party's commitments or obligations under this Treaty. * It is understood that the term "prudential reasons" includes the maintenance of the safety, soundness, integrity, or financial responsibility of individual financial institutions or cross-border financial service suppliers. ). Even more concerning is that the term prudential reasons has a footnote that specifically defines it as "the maintenance of the safety, soundness, integrity, or financial responsibility of individual financial institutions or cross-border financial service suppliers." Thus, the more macroprudential regulations of inflows of capital do not apply to US treaties (Gallagher et al. 2013) .
Indeed, the United States has repeatedly said as much to its negotiating partners. As discussed earlier, Chile deployed capital account regulations with some success. The United States negotiated FTAs with Chile and Singapore at the turn of the twenty-first century, and both went into force in 2004. But the limits on capital account regulations included in the US model became major sticking points for both Chile and Singapore. In fact, Robert Zoellick, head of the Office of the US Trade Representative (USTR), had to intervene with the finance minister of Chile to salvage the negotiations over this issue (Saez 2006) . During those negotiations, the United States negotiated a "compromise" (the inclusion of a "cooling-off " provision under which a US investor cannot file a claim for a period of one year after the provision has been deployed) that, with some variations, has also been used in agreements with Singapore, Peru, and Colombia. Interestingly, however, it has not become a matter of practice. Such a coolingoff period was not included as a The compromise cooling-off periods are illustrated in an Annex to the investment chapter of some agreements, such as the US-Chile Free Trade Agreement. The rationale is that the host nation may need to address or stem a financial crisis and that it should not be subject to claims in the middle of such action. However-and this is important-the cooling-off period allows a foreign investor to sue for damages related to capital controls that were deployed during the cooling-off year, although the investor cannot file the claim until after that year. To be clear: the claim for damages can be for a measure taken by the host country taken during the cooling-off year (Hornbeck 2003) . Note also that these provisions are not mutual. The cooling-off period is only for investors filing claims against "a Party other than the United States."
Two US treaties do stand out. The NAFTA has a balance-of-payments exception and the South Korea-United States Free Trade Agreement (KORUS) has an annex to its investment chapter that grants South Korea the ability to deploy temporary capital account regulations. Article 2014(1) of NAFTA is the balanceof-payments exception and is very similar to the GATS exception; it can be invoked when the host states "experience serious balance of payments difficulties, or the threat thereof." Like similar exceptions at the WTO, use of the exception must be temporary and nondiscriminatory. The NAFTA provisions have thus raised concerns similar to those voiced about the balance-of-payments exception in the GATS. Although it may be possible to regulate the outflow of capital under this provision when there is a serious crisis, regulating inflows as a preventative measure may be more difficult (Nadal 1996) .
Beyond the academic community, the IMF has expressed concern that US FTAs and BITs do not provide enough flexibility to regulate the capital account. Around the time of the Chile and Singapore negotiations, senior IMF officials in the legal department wrote articles arguing that BITs should have at least temporary derogations for balance-of-payments difficulties and that the coolingoff period was not sufficient. Sean Hagan (2000) expressed concern that, if one nation forbids a host country from using capital controls on a temporary basis but the host country is permitted to use controls under agreements with other nations, then the controls will be discriminatory in nature and lead to distortions. Deborah Siegel (2004), who called the cooling-off provisions "draconian," expressed concern that the US transfers provisions raised jurisdictional issues with the IMF. The US provisions call for free transfers of all current transactions, but unlike WTO treaties and those of other capital exporters, the US provisions do not include mention of the ability of the IMF to recommend capital controls as part of a financial program. Siegel argues that FTAs "create a risk that in complying with its obligations under the FTA, a member could be rendered ineligible to use the Fund's resources under the Fund's articles" (2004, 4). As we have seen in chapter 6, the IMF institutional view states, "The limited flexibility afforded by some bilateral and regional agreements in respect to liberalization obligations may create challenges for the management of capital flows. These challenges should be weighed against the agreements' potential benefits. In particular, such agreements could be a step toward broader liberalization. However, these agreements in many cases do not provide appropriate safeguards or proper sequencing of liberalization, and could thus benefit from reform to include these protections" (IMF 2012b, 8) .
Not only does US policy deviate from the GATS, but the investment provisions in US FTAs and of US BITs stand in stark contrast to the treaties of other major capital-exporting nations. The European Union, Japan, Canada, and increasingly China are major capital exporters. Each of these capital exporters has numerous BITs and FTAs with nations across the world. And loosely, the BITs of these nations have the same general characteristics found in US BITs. In contrast to the US treaties, however, regarding the use of capital account regulations to prevent and mitigate financial crises, all BITs and investment provisions of the FTAs of these exporters contain either a broad balance-of-payments safeguard exception or a controlled-entry exception, which allows a nation to deploy its domestic laws pertaining to the management of capital flows. Examples of the balance-of-payments approach can be found in the European Union-South Africa and European Union-Mexico FTAs, the Japan-South Korea BIT, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) agreements. The Japan-Korea BIT has language that clearly allows for restrictions on both inflows and outflows, presumably inspired by the 1997 crisis. The BIT states that the nations may violate the transfers provisions (Salucuse 2010; Viterbo 2012).
As mentioned, another way capital account regulations are treated by other capital exporters in their FTAs and BITs is a controlled-entry exception (in which the domestic laws of the host nation regarding cross-border financial regulations are deferred to). The FTAs that Canada and the European Union have with Chile and Colombia each have a balance-of-payments safeguard and a controlledentry deferment. As an example of a controlled-entry exception, is in the Annex of the investment chapter of the FTA between Canada and Colombia: "Colombia reserves the right to maintain or adopt measures to maintain or preserve the stability of its currency, in accordance with Colombian domestic legislation." 4 Controlled-entry provisions are to be found in BITs as well. The European Union does not sign many BITs as an entity, but its member states do. For example, the China-Germany BIT states that transfers must comply with Chinese laws on exchange controls (Anderson 2009b). China has to approve all foreign inflows and outflows of short-term capital (IMF 2009b) .
Interestingly, EU member-state BITs vary a great deal. Some, such as the China-Germany BIT and the UK-Bangladesh BIT, allow for a nation to defer to its own laws governing capital controls. In contrast, Sweden and Austria at one time had US-style BITs with no exceptions whatsoever. But the European Court of Justice ruled in 2009 that these BITs of Sweden and Austria with EMDs were in violation of their obligations under the EU treaty. Although the EU treaty requires EU members to allow for free transfers, it also allows members to have exceptions. The Court found that the Swedish and Austrian treaties were incompatible with the EU treaty and that such treaties must be renegotiated to include exceptions to the transfer provisions (Salacuse 2010).
It should be clear from the our discussion so far that the regulation of crossborder finance is in fundamental violation of the core principal of US trade and investment treaties requiring the free transfer of funds without delay. That said, the United States does not have a large number of treaties at the time of this writing. Table 8 .3 lists the countries that currently have the full policy space to regulate capital flows because they have not liberalized financial services under the WTO and do not have a trade or investment treaty with the United States.
The first column of table 8.4 lists countries that may have the least amount of policy space to regulate capital flows; they have signed and ratified US FTAs or BITs with the United States. Only one of those countries, South Korea, has successfully negotiated a controlled-entry clause for its regulations on cross-border finance. A handful of countries have annexes that allow for the cooling-off period for investor state disputes. Mexico, under the NAFTA (signed in 1994), is the last nation that the United States granted a balance-of-payments exception to. 
reclaiming and Preserving Policy space after the Global Financial crisis
As nations have sought to reregulate capital flows in the wake of the global financial crisis, many have attempted to reclaim or preserve the policy space to do so in trade and investment treaties. Between 2010 and 2012, there was an assessment of the GATS exceptions under the WTO. In terms of FTAs and BITs with the United States, there was a concerted effort by EMDs to preserve their policy space under two East Asian trade and investment treaties.
In the wake of the global financial crisis, Ecuador led an effort for the WTO to adopt interpretations of existing treaty language to ensure that existing treaties granted policy space for a variety of financial regulations. Both the WTO and FTAs/BITs have a process for including interpretive notes or amendments that could clarify or change existing language in current treaties. Article IX: 2 of the GATS allows the Council for Trade in Services to make official interpretations that can be adopted by either the WTO Ministerial Conference or the General Council, with a three-quarters majority vote. For example, an interpretive note could clarify that language under the GATS so that the balance-of-payments exception and the prudential carve-out would cover the use of cross-border financial regulations.
Ecuador engaged with the Committee on Financial Services in a process that would have led to an interpretation of this kind. Ecuador had put in place a number of regulations on the financial sector following the global financial crisis. In that process, the country found that capital was fleeing to nations without such regulations and thus began to control the outflow of capital. In response, the flow-recipient nation threatened to file a WTO case against Ecuador on grounds that Ecuador was violating the GATS. The process at the Committee on Financial Services was hotly contested. It centered around the vague prudential measures exception in the GATS that I have outlined. Ecuador and many global civil society organizations wanted an illustrative list of regulations that would be permitted under this exception. On the other side, industrialized countries (including the United States) and EMDs such as Brazil argued that it was better to leave the language vague. They worried that listing some measures and not others would implicitly disfavor those that were not listed. In the end, this loose agreement between some EMDs and the industrialized nations outnumbered the countries supporting the Ecuadorean proposal. This outcome could be positive for nations hoping to regulate capital flows, given that disputes are settled between nation-states using a state-to-state dispute-resolution system at the WTO, rather than the investor-state system in US FTAs and BITS. Thus, countries such as the United States can keep their word, or be held to their word, in the Committee on Financial Services meetings because the state is the actor that makes the decision about whether to file a claim. In FTAs and BITs, in contrast, governments and regulators have no say about when a private investor will file a claim.
Cross-border financial regulations also became contentious issues in two East Asian trade negotiations with the United States. The first was the South KoreaUnited States Free Trade Agreement (KORUS). KORUS was negotiated during the George W. Bush administration but did not enter into force until 2012. As noted previously, South Korea has an open capital account but has long reserved the right of the Finance Ministry to regulate capital flows under its Foreign Exchange Transactions Act. As Chile, Colombia, Singapore, and other nations had proposed during their negotiations with the United States, South Korea asked for a controlled-entry clause for its law in the FTA. Unlike Chile and the others, however, South Korea (almost) got its way.
The KORUS, Chapter 11, deals with investment, and its Annex 11-G pertains to transfers. The annex is essentially a controlled-entry clause stating that nothing in the financial services or investment chapters of the treaty will restrict the ability of South Korea to use the special powers under its Foreign Exchange Transactions Act. The treaty imposes some limitations on the ability of South Korea to use the act, however. The annex notes that the measures cannot be imposed for more than one year and that they are subject to the "national treatment" provisions in the KORUS-thus making it harder for Korea to discriminate based on residence.
5 Nevertheless, this annex is the first time in the history of US trade policy that such a carve-out has been permitted.
The second contentious negotiation began in 2008, when the United States was negotiating a FTA-the TPP-with several Pacific Rim countries. The nations engaged in the negotiations (at the end of 2013) were Brunei, Chile, New Zealand, Singapore, Australia, Peru, Vietnam, Malaysia, Mexico, Canada, and Japan. As in previous negotiations, the United States proposed investment language based on its Model BIT. The language required that all capital move freely and without delay among the parties to the agreement and did not include an exception for regulating the inflow of capital or a balance-of-payments exception. Furthermore, the agreement specified investor-state dispute resolution.
During the TPP negotiations, Chile sought to obtain a controlled-entry clause for its Encaje legislation, which permitted Chile to deploy its unremunerated reserve requirement (URR) when necessary. Chile had obtained this flexibility under its agreements with Canada and the European Union, but not the United States. Given that the TPP was likely to supersede the United States-Chile FTA, Chile hoped that the TPP would rectify the FTA limitations. In an opinion article published in a Peruvian newspaper, coinciding with TPP negotiations, Rodrigo Contreras, the outgoing Chilean chief TPP negotiator, said, "Our countries need the flexibility that has been recognized by multilateral trade negotiations on issues such as intellectual property, environmental protection, capital controls, and the proper balance between the rights of investors and the state"; furthermore, "The International Monetary Fund has reiterated that one of the main challenges for Latin America is to restore the ability to apply financial safeguards. In the TPP it does not make sense to further liberalize capital flows, or deprive countries of legitimate tools to safeguard financial stability" (Contreras 2013).
Malaysia tabled a balance-of-payments clause to the TPP. The clause, as confirmed by leaked text of the chapter under Article XX.3, is very analogous to the balance-of-payments wording found in the GATS and many Asian FTAs.
6 Such a safeguard would allow the use of regulations on the outflow of capital during a crisis, as Malaysia had done in the wake of its crisis in 1997 -1998 (Gallagher et al. 2013 .
The USTR received significant push-back on this issue throughout the period 2008-2013. Moreover, as of 2013 the United States had not changed its position that the TPP should not include a prudential measures exception that covered cross-border financial regulations, should not include a balance-ofpayments exception, and should not include a controlled-entry clause for Chile (as the KORUS with South Korea does); in addition, it should not even include a cooling-off provision, which had been included in smaller US FTAs in the past.
Barack Obama, when he was a candidate for the presidency, committed to renegotiate the NAFTA and also said he would not sign NAFTA-like deals when in office. To that end, he appointed several interest-group representatives and experts to lead a reevaluation of the US Model BIT and to make recommendations to the president that would lead to the new Model BIT. The group was referred to as the Subcommittee on Investment of the US State Department Advisory Committee on International Economic Policy. Among other issues, the group was specifically asked to examine whether US treaties should be adapted in the wake of the financial crisis. Some members of the subcommittee immediately zeroed in on the limited nature of the prudential exception (and the language of the cooling-off provision) and the lack of a balance-of-payments exception. Other members of the subcommittee, who represented financial and business interests, were vehemently opposed to changes or reinterpretations of the language on these matters. In the end, the subcommittee remained split on the issue and was not able to provide uniform advice to the president on this matter. and FTAs include a safeguard provision to allow the imposition of temporary capital controls, as well as a balance-of-payments safeguard (Anderson et al. 2012) . The State Department and the USTR took all these inputs and released the 2011 Model BIT, which did not contain an expanded prudential exception or a balance-of-payments safeguard. The US position on these issues regarding the TPP was thus codified in the new model BIT.
Members of the US Congress and others in the civil society that hotly contested this policy throughout. Representatives Barney Frank and Sander Levin (D-Michigan) wrote numerous letters to the USTR and to the Treasury Department and met with senior staff at the both departments as well.
Also in 2011, more than 250 economists from across the globe signed a letter informing the US government of the new economic evidence on the efficacy of regulating cross-border finance and calling on the United States to place safeguards in its trade treaties (Global Development and Environment Institute 2011) . In response, lobby groups representing eighteen different interests groups also wrote a stiff letter to the US government arguing that its existing regime was already flexible enough. They noted that nations could indeed impose regulations when they saw fit but would have to compensate private investors for doing so if the investors sued those states in private investor-state tribunals. They also argued that capital controls hurt US jobs and cited evidence suggesting that regulating cross-border financial flows was ineffective. The groups signing this letter included the Financial Services Roundtable, the National Association of Manufacturers, the Business Roundtable, the US Chamber of Commerce, and the US Council for International Business.
In rebuttal, Representatives Frank and Levin cited the new thinking at the IMF and in academia about capital controls (specifically mentioning the letter) and the need for a more stable world in the wake of the crisis. Frank enjoyed significant clout on the issue given that he was the co-author of the Dodd-Frank legislation on reregulating the US financial industry after the crisis. Letters were exchanged and meetings were held in the beginning of 2012 and then in late 2012 after the IMF changed its institutional view on regulating cross-border finance. In formal responses to the representatives and the economists, Timothy Geithner, then secretary of the treasury, echoed the concerns of the financial sector, saying that US treaties already gave nations the leeway to regulate. Moreover, Geithner argued that other measures, such as interest rate manipulation, capital requirements, and reserve accumulation, were more appropriate for nations looking to manage capital flows.
When this book went to press, negotiators had completed work on several provisions of the TTP. But several key issues such as intellectual property, environment and labor, investor-state dispute settlement, and safeguarding crossborder financial regulation were still "bracketed" (i.e., under contention).
The Political economy of Policy space for capital account regulations in the Trading system
The United States, backed by financial interests, sought to bring issues of the capital account into the strong international standards of the trade and investment regime. How did the issue of capital account liberalization move into the trading system, and why did so many nations agree to liberalize their capital accounts under trade and investment treaties? I next explore how the nature of the trade and negotiating institutions, issues of market power, and ideas integrate to explain the various outcomes. The key factors are summarized in table 8.5.
At the WTO, many EMDs were able to refrain from committing to the liberalization of financial services because of the nature of the WTO negotiating system, because they had more bargaining power there, and because their domestic constituencies were still freshly concerned about the myriad financial crises that had hit the developing world in the 1990s. This also led to EMD coalitions that crafted some of the exceptions discussed earlier. The United States is able to extract more concessions in its FTAs and BITs because of the asymmetric bargaining power it has relative to the nations with which it negotiates, the very strong financial lobby in the United States, and the fact that it has signed treaties largely with nations that view capital account liberalization in the same way as the United States.
The World Trade Organization-General Agreement on Trade in Services
The GATS negotiations had limited reach with respect to EMD commitments in financial services. The GATS negotiations on financial services liberalization were the result of domestic lobbying efforts by financial firms that (rightly) convinced the US government that it had a comparative advantage in the export of financial services. But, with the exception of the handful of EMDs, most of the commitments were made by industrialized nations that had already opened their capital accounts. By and large, EMDs did not liberalize trade in financial services because of "fears of the implications of liberalization for weak domestic financial institutions, a perceived absence of reciprocity given that many developing countries are importers and not exporters of financial services. Another concern revolved around the implications of GATS rules for the management of capital flows and prudential regulation and supervision" (Hoekman and Kostecki 2009, 349) . EMDs were able to exercise such preferences at the WTO because of the nature of the institution. The positive list approach tilted the negotiating table toward a discussion of liberalizing those sectors that a nation already saw as ready or willing to liberalize. Many EMDs exercised intra-forum leverage (see chapter 6). They refused to liberalize financial services but were still able to put together a larger WTO deal because there were other sectors (within services negotiations and, more important, in manufacturing) that EMDs were willing to liberalize and that the United States and other industrialized nations coveted.
EMDs also crafted significant coalitions to help block proposals by the industrialized countries and to craft some of the exceptions. The prudential exception in the Annex on Financial Services was initially submitted during the negotiations by the South East Asian Central Banks and Monetary Authorities (SEACEN), a coalition headed by Malaysia and consisting of Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, Myanmar, Nepal, Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, and Thailand. These negotiations occurred at the height of the East Asian financial crisis (Narlikar 2003). These exception clauses were also supported by financial regulators in the United States (Key 2003; Hoekman and Kostecki 2009) .
Furthermore, key EMDs such as Brazil and India agreed to enter into longterm discussions about the liberalization of financial services but did not commit at the time. The WTO negotiations as a whole were seen as a grand bargain. Industrialized nations agreed to liberalize tariffs in textiles and apparel and agreed to eventually reduce agricultural subsidies; in exchange, EMDs agreed to liberalize manufacturing tariffs and agreed to eventually liberalize services (Narlikar 2003).
US Free-Trade Agreements and Bilateral Investment Treaties
The United States was frustrated by its inability to forge a consensus at the WTO, where decisions must be made on consensus, and at the turn of the twenty-first century, it largely abandoned multilateral trade liberalization in favor of a new strategy officially referred to as "competitive liberalization." The goals of the strategy, adopted under US President George W. Bush and continued by President Barak Obama, are to "overcome or bypass obstacles; exert maximum leverage for openness, target the needs of developing countries, especially the most committed to economic and political reforms" (Evenett and Meier 2008, 36) . Explicitly, the United States wanted to sign FTAs and BITs with nations that would be willing to negotiate on the deeper issues (such as investment) where the United States was not gaining ground at the global level.
As we saw earlier, limiting the ability of nations to regulate cross-border finance has been a cornerstone of US trade policy. The United States has been able to accomplish this using FTAs and BITs, and not at the WTO, because of the asymmetric bargaining power it enjoys in such negotiations, compared to those at the WTO; also, many of the nations that chose to sign such agreements with the United States have the same idea about capital account liberalization.
Capital account regulations and FTAs became a highly controversial issue during negotiations between the United States and Chile and between the United States and Singapore in the early 2000s. Chile is well known for its URR (under which a certain percentage of capital inflows must be deposited in the Central Bank for a minimum period of time). This measure has been shown econometrically to have buffered Chile from the acute crises that struck the region in the 1990s. The requirement was also quite controversial among EMD partners. Chile pushed hard for an exception to the investment chapters of FTAs so that it could use its famed capital account regulations. It had succeeded in its negotiations with Canada to have its law carved out of their agreement. Indeed, Canada was one of the few nations that did not support amending the IMF Articles of Agreement to liberalize capital flows precisely because it had safeguarded the ability of Chile to deploy regulations under a trade treaty (Chwieroth 2010a). In contrast, the United States would not budge on this issue, and the Chilean authorities had to settle for the cooling-off provisions. In the 2013 TPP negotiations, Chile tried to re-open the issue, hoping that an exception in the TPP would supersede the older United States-Chile FTA.
Singapore saw that Malaysia had successfully deployed controls on outflows in the wake of the Asian financial crisis and wanted to reserve that option. The Bush administration negotiated similar deals with Peru, Panama, South Korea, and Colombia. The Obama administration maintained the position taken by the Bush administration. As discussed previously, in response to a letter signed by more than 250 economists urging the Obama administration to provide flexibility for capital controls in US trade deals, the United States replied that it did not intend to change its treaties in that direction. This position was echoed by numerous financial services coalitions in the United States (Drajem 2011).
The cooling-off language triggered controversy in the United States, leading to hearings specifically on the subject back on April 1, 2003, before the Subcommittee on Domestic and International Monetary, Trade and Technology of the US House Committee on Financial Services. 8 The committee was chaired by Representative Michael Oxley (R-Indiana), the majority head; the minority head was Barney Frank (D-Massachusetts). In general, the hearings revealed that most Republicans were against the use of capital controls, whereas Democrats favored more flexibility. The hearings were very lively, to say the least. The leading advocate for restricting capital controls was John Taylor, then undersecretary for international affairs of the US Treasury in the Bush administration. As a Stanford University economist, he had become famous for the Taylor rule, which sets a formula for inflation targeting. Insiders thus began referring to the cooling-off provisions as the "Taylor provisions." Interestingly, the hearings included harsh rebuttals to Taylor by Nancy Birdsall of the Center for Global Development, Jagdish Bhagwati of Colombia University, and Daniel Tarullo, then of Georgetown University and now on the Board of Governors of the US Federal Reserve System. These individuals are staunch supporters of free trade in goods but argued that capital account liberalization without exception is dangerous from both economic and foreign policy perspectives. Representative Carolyn Maloney (D-New York; now chair of Joint Economic Committee) argued in favor of flexibility. At the hearings, Barney Frank famously remarked that "ice is in the eyes of the beholder," arguing that the cooling-off period still effectively restricts Chile and Singapore from using capital controls. In the end, the Democrats and their supporters were outnumbered. Hirschman (1945) showed more than a generation ago that asymmetric bargaining power and influence can play a big role in determining the outcome of trade negotiations. Kirshner (1993) extends such logic to monetary affairs. Negotiators from large nations with large markets have significant leverage over negotiators from smaller countries. The average size of the US economy relative to its negotiating partners is orders of magnitude larger. Therefore, trade negotiations at the bilateral or regional level in large part focus on the classic market-access-for-regulatory-reform equation (Shadlen 2005 (Shadlen , 2008 2008). At the WTO, this is more balanced because of the one country-one vote and consensus nature of the institution and because of the newfound market power held by many larger EMDs. Now it is access to the EMD markets that the West really covets.
At the WTO, many smaller EMDs could coalesce around Brazil, India, and China on these issues, but that is much more difficult in a two-country negotiation. Of course, when a nation such as the United States negotiates a deal with a nation such as Uruguay, Uruguay has little bargaining power and a Hirschmanlike analysis (rightly) predicts that Uruguay will pretty much have to "sign on the dotted line" on US proposals-this is true especially when a small country has to deal with the negative list negotiating format in which everything must be liberalized except those sectors pinpointed by an EMD to be protected. This power is accentuated by collective action problems. From a national welfare perspective, it is in the interest of any government negotiator to ensure that his or her country has the policy space to ensure financial stability. But financial stability is more of a public good; thus the losers in trade deals that restrict the ability of the government to regulate capital flows (the general public) are dispersed. In contrast, the winners are concentrated-they are the highly organized banks and firms that will not have to bear the cost of regulation (Shadlen 2008; Gallagher 2008) .
The US trade deal with South Korea was different, however. South Korea is a large and growing market, with many capital goods sectors where powerful US firms sell goods as inputs; it also provides a large consumer market and a hub for shipping services. Remember that, when Chile negotiated with the United States, it wanted a special carve-out for its Encaje, but the United States would not grant an exception. In the case of the KORUS, however, the United States (against its wishes) allowed South Korea to carve its Foreign Exchange Transactions Act out of the agreement. The United States had enough market power of its own to push back but not as far as it could in the agreement with Chile. The United States grants South Korea the ability to deploy its law, but under certain conditions. One of those conditions is that the act be deployed in a manner consistent with national treatment (Kelsey 2011).
Nations that believe capital flows should be regulated have been successful at keeping the policy space to do so when they have significant market poweror can form coalitions with other nations that do-in institutions where that power can be channeled. The WTO has a one country-one vote voting system and nations have to reach a consensus on all provisions in an agreement. Large nations such as Brazil and India can leverage their newfound economic power to avoid making significant commitments under the GATS. Doing this in bilateral negotiations is difficult, as Hirschman pointed out so many years ago. Nevertheless, South Korea has many sectors that the United States coveted, and its market power and trading across issues caused the United States to make an unprecedented concession on capital account regulations in their FTA that other nations in the TPP negotiations were seeking to duplicate in 2014.
